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DEATH, TAXES, and financial scandals-these are the certainties of
life. From the latter flows the many amendments Congress has made
to the federal securities laws that are now in the eighth decade of their
existence. Financial scandals appear necessary to move Congress to
address securities regulatory issues. Indeed, much of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19341 itself can be traced to the highly publicized
Pecora Hearings2 "that revealed a wide range of market abuses (many
of which are listed in the Act's preamble).3 The insider trading scan-
dals during the break-and-take days of the early 1980s incensed the
public and caused Congress to enact the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984. 4 Further revelations of insider trading abuse, particularly
among investment bankers, prompted enactment of the Insider Trad-
ing and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988. 5 A series of market
abuses in the late 1980s caused Congress to substantially augment the
Securities and Exchange Commission's enforcement powers through
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
* Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for the
valuable research assistance of Michael Mahoney Frandina as well as the helpful comments
of the participants at the "Federalism In Securities Regulation: Rethinking the Balance"
symposium sponsored by the University of San Francisco School of Law in February 2006
where this paper was presented.
1. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2000)).
2. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Banking Committee, 72nd
and 73rd Cong. (1932-1934); S. Rep. No. 73-1455 (1934).
3. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2000).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
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1990.6 And, more recently, the numerous financial frauds revealed in
2001 and 2002 propelled the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX" or
"the Act") onto the statute books. 7
Although one might conclude that SOX is significant because of
the wide range of regulatory issues it encompasses, this would be in-
correct. SOX's profound contribution lies in the tectonic regulatory
shifts it introduces to a handful of issues: creating an independent
standard setter for accounting principles8 and auditing standards,9
strengthening the internal and external financial reporting proce-
dures,10 and accelerating disclosure requirements to include more
"real time" revelations of financially significant events."1 Those who
have a vested interest in the status quo see the changes as ominous
and ill-conceived. These critics are joined by others who prefer the
freedom of the marketplace over regulatory intrusions as a means to
correct operational failures. Each group of critics points to the unto-
ward entry of federal law into a realm long ceded to the states: corpo-
rate governance and the regulation of the internal affairs of
corporations. A unifying theme among SOX critics is that the Act's
provisions lack solid empirical support.
I. Rehabilitating Accounting Standards and the Auditor
Roscoe Pound reminds us that being a member of a profession is
not the same as belonging to an association of grocery stores. 12 A pro-
6. Pub. L. No. 101429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
7. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to be codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108, 116 Stat. 745, 768 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b) (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2000)).
9. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-107, 116 Stat. 745,
750-69 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
10. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 401, 116 Stat. 745, 785
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(i)-(j) (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(2000)) (calling for the SEC to adopt disclosure requirements respecting off-balance sheet
financing and other arrangements, as well as the treatment of pro-forma financial state-
ments); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745, 788 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West Supp. 2006)) (calling for management to annually assess
the company's internal controls and the firm's auditor to render a report of management
assessment); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 408, 116 Stat. 745, 790
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7266(c) (West Supp. 2006)) (mandating that the SEC review not
less than every three years each reporting company's filings with the SEC).
11. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 409, 116 Stat. 745, 791 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(l) (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000)) (re-
quiring more rapid and current disclosures among reporting companies).
12. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 7 (1953) (an or-
ganized profession is not "the same sort of thing as a retail grocers' association.").
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fession, such as the accounting profession, has obligations beyond
those to its clients. Many people, however, have good cause to ponder
whether some quarters of the accounting profession took their eyes
off lofty aspirations of professionalism over the course of the 1980s
and 1990s. Simply put, accountants too frequently saw their obliga-
tions being to the firm's management and not to the firm's stockhold-
ers or others who depended upon the integrity of the financial
reporting system to guide their actions. Indeed, the accounting pro-
fession is the lynchpin of any market economy.
With the relaxation of professional restrictions during the
1970s, 13 the accounting profession became increasingly competitive.
This rise in competition manifested itself in accountants attempting to
steal each other's clients, which then placed downward pressure on
audit fees. The major accounting firms discovered that by providing
non-audit services, they could sample the good life enjoyed by lawyers,
investment bankers, and consultants. Their non-audit revenues grew
much more rapidly than did their audit revenues. 14 As audit firms be-
came more and more dependent on their non-audit revenues, the his-
torical independence of audit firms from their clients suffered. 15
SOX rescued the accounting profession from the death spiral in
which it entered. As a result of SOX, the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board ("FASB") enjoyed autonomy from accounting firms for
the first time since it was created in 1974. Before SOX, the FASB's
primary funding came from financial contributions made by major
accounting firms to the Financial Accounting Foundation. The ac-
counting firms' financial support was voluntary, and the individual
firms' eagerness to write checks often reflected how much their audit
clients appreciated the flexibility they enjoyed under accounting stan-
dards and interpretations approved by the FASB. Since SOX, the
FASB's financial lifeline is no longer derived from voluntary support
from private accounting firms; instead, it is now derived from fees im-
posed on public companies. 16
13. See Stephen A. Zeff, How the U.S. Accounting Profession Got Where It Is Today: Part I,
17 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 189 (2003) (identifying that competition among accounting
firms for audit clients began in 1972 under pressure from federal antitrust regulators).
14. See ARTHUR LEVTr, TAKE ON THE STREET 156 (2002) (non-audit fees growing three
times faster than audit revenues).
15. For a detailed review of several studies on whether consulting comprised the audi-
tors' independence, see PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, THE PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2000), http://www.pobauditpanel.org/download.html.
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108, 116 Stat. 745, 768
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 7 7s (2000)) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s(b) (West Supp. 2006)
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Similar financial independence now exists with respect to the de-
velopment of auditing standards and disciplining auditors. SOX relo-
cates standard setting for auditing procedures and disciplining
members in the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB"). 17 Prior to SOX, auditing standards had been
under the control of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants ("AICPA"), whose pronouncements too frequently re-
flected the wishes of its members. Thus, an indelible contribution of
SOX is the severance of the financial purse strings long held by the
auditors and their clients over those whose responsibility it was to es-
tablish the metrics for financial reporting and procedures for audits.
The course taken in Chapter One of SOX appears to be working.
For example, after SOX, the FASB manifested its independence by
approving the expensing of stock options, 18 a long-simmering issue.
Equally noticeable is the forward movement on the FASB's agenda of
the reporting for entity consolidation accounting, 19 which addresses,
among other areas, the abuses that won Enron its place in history. The
consolidation accounting topic has been on the FASB's agenda for
over twenty years. Although the PCAOB is in its infancy, there is evi-
dence of its energy with respect to poor auditing practices that was not
investigated under the AICPA. For example, it has now completed,
and reported on, two successive reviews of audit samples by each of
the Big Four accounting firms. Each round of PCAOB reviews has lev-
eled sharp criticism of practices occurring in the Big Four accounting
firms; 20 such criticism did not occur in the love-fest peer reviews over-
seen earlier by the AICPA's Public Oversight Board. Nevertheless, the
PCAOB remains in its formative years, and it is premature to forecast
much about whether it will be an effective regulatory body that can rid
the profession of poor auditors and poor auditing practices.
(conditioning the SEC's acceptance of accounting standards from a private entity on that
entity receiving funding as set forth in Section 109 of SOX).
17. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103, 116 Stat. 745, 755
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(a) (1) (West Supp. 2006) (conferring broad authority on
the PCAOB to adopt auditing standards, subject to oversight and approval per Section 107
of SOX)).
18. See FASB Statement 123R (2005).
19. See FINANCIAL AccOuNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACcour-
INC STANDARDS No. 94, CONSOLIDATION OF ALL MAJORITY-OWNED SUBSIDIARIES (2005),
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas94.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Statement Concerning the Issuance of Inspection Reports, PCAOB Re-
lease No. 104-2004-001 (Aug. 26, 2004).
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A. From Technical Requirements to a Principles-Based System
Chapter Two of SOX has a host of provisions designed to
strengthen the auditor's independence. To assure that the auditor's
client is not the reporting company's management, but rather stock-
holders and other financial statement users, SOX anchors the audi-
tor's relationship to the firm's audit committee, which has the
exclusive power to retain and discharge the auditor.2' Moreover, the
audit committee is charged with engaging, at least annually, the audi-
tor in a dialogue in which the critical accounting choices, estimates,
and judgments are reviewed. This is to assure that the audit commit-
tee understands that the firm's financial position and performance
are fairly presented-as contrasted with the artful selection of ac-
counting choices and estimates that bear no purpose other than to
reach a desirable reporting objective.
It is important to identify the various linkages that have strength-
ened financial reporting and are provided throughout Chapter Two
of SOX. One concern when Congress enacted SOX was that the ac-
counting metrics were too rule-oriented and not based on broader
principles. The concern was that the FASB standards were so full of
technical requirements that the manner of reporting for a transaction
remained in the hands of management who could structure the trans-
action to technically fall outside the scope of a FASB statement even
though the transaction was substantively the very type of transaction
the FASB intended its statement to reach. Finding a way to articulate
this concern in a statute proved immensely complex, so instead SOX
directed the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to study
the desirability and means for achieving a more principles-based ac-
counting metrics. 22 Another approach is to require the reporting en-
tity to include in periodic filing with the SEC the certifications by the
chief executive officer and chief financial officer that the financial
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m)(2) (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f
(2000)) (audit committee directly responsible for appointment, compensation, and over-
sight of the firm's auditor).
22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 108(d) calls for a study of moving to a principles-based ac-
counting. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §108, 116 Stat. 745, 769 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A §77s(b) (West Supp. 2006)). The resulting study of what such a system
would entail reflects the obvious challenges of such a system. See SEC Study Pursuant to
Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States
Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System (July 25, 2003)
http://www.sec.gov/news/Studies/principlesbasedstand.htm. See generally James D. Cox,
Reforming The Culture Of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB & The Metrics For Accounting Mea-
surements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (2003).
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statements "fairly present .. . the financial condition and results of
operations" of the company. 23 The obvious objective of this part of the
officers' certification is to assure that the financial reports do more
than comply with technical requirements of Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles ("GAAP").24
Any principles-based system necessarily calls for more judgment
than the heretofore dominant rules-based system. Whether this system
will prove more successful in communicating the true economic sig-
nificance of business transactions depends on who exercises the judg-
ment pursuant to a guiding principle. The firm's managers are
responsible for accounting decisions and financial reporting. The au-
ditor's role is to assure that the choices, estimates, and judgments ex-
ercised comply with generally accepted accounting principles. To use
an analogy to sports, management calls and runs the plays, but the
auditors act as referees whose role is to assure that management stays
within the governing reporting rules. Under a principles-based system,
a wider range of choices may exist, with permissible choices being elu-
cidated by a relatively broad objective. If the relationship of the audi-
tor to the audit client had remained as it was prior to SOX, the
benefits of a principle-based reporting system-or for that matter, im-
proved financial reporting-would have had less of a chance of being
achieved.
B. Keeping the Auditor Independent
Despite enhancing requirements to provide financial certifica-
tions and enhancing sanctions for reporting violations, SOX has done
little to change the operating environment of managers. The execu-
tive's incentives have not changed much compared to pre-SOX. Man-
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 302 gave rise to SEC Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and
15d-14, requiring the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer to certify in
each submitted quarterly and annual report to the SEC that, among other matters, "the
financial statements, and other financial information included in the report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer of,
and for, the periods presented in the report."
24. Among the requirements for executive certifications is that the financial state-
ments "fairly present" the firm's financial position. The full meaning of this requirement is
illustrated in United States v. Simon, where the Second Circuit upheld an instruction that
mere technical compliance with standard accounting and auditing practices did not insu-
late the auditor from criminal responsibility for false reporting when the auditor knew that
the financials statements falsely presented the firm as solvent. 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir.
1969). Similarly, the officers through their certification must be assured that the firms'
financial position and performance are fairly presented, not merely presented according
to the technical metrics of generally accepted accounting principles.
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agers still want earlier recording of revenues, later recording of
expenses, and performance measurements that reward the executives
who achieve their numbers. The tension for a principles-based system
will therefore be keenest at the intersection of management's reports
and their review by the auditor. The independent audit committee is
now interjected into this maelstrom by anchoring the relationship of
the auditor with the audit committee instead of with the reporting
company s managers.
Audit committees have long been a voluntary fixture of American
corporate governance. In 1999, audit committees became mandatory
for listed companies when the SEC approved improved listing require-
ments for the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), Americans Stock
Exchange ("AMEX"), and NASDAQ.25 The new listing requirements
called upon domestic corporations to have an audit committee com-
posed solely of financially literate independent directors. Each audit
committee was called upon to have at least one member with financial
sophistication, such as employment experience in finance or account-
ing, and to have a written charter. The actions by the exchanges were
prompted by a Blue Ribbon Committee study,26 which was prompted
by a study of companies charged with fraud between 1987 and 1997.
The study found, among other factors, that (1) twenty-five percent of
the surveyed companies did not have an audit committee, (2) of those
companies that did have audit committees, nearly one-third of the
committee members' independence was compromised by close rela-
tionships with, or actual participation in, the firm's management, and
(3) sixty-five percent of the committee members lacked accounting or
financial expertise. 27 Further, the improved listing requirements were
not mandatory for foreign issuers, and listed companies had some
modest flexibility on whether all members of the audit committee
must be independent. SOX changes both of these requirements, man-
dating that all reporting companies, domestic or foreign, have an au-
dit committee whose members all must be independent. 28 More
25. See SEC, Exchange Act Rel. No. 42231 (Dec. 1, 1999) (approving changes in list-
ing requirements of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ).
26. See Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effective-
ness of Corporate Audit Committees, reprinted in 54 Bus. LAW. 1067 (1999).
27. See Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, An Analysis
of U.S. Public Companies, at 5 (monograph published by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 1999).
28. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 202, 117 Stat. 745, 772-73
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000));
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 117 Stat. 745, 775-77 (codified at
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1((West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000)).
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importantly, SOX anchors the auditor's relationship to the audit com-
mittee instead of where it was previously, with management. It does
this by empowering the audit committee with exclusive authority to
retain and dismiss the auditor.
Furthermore, the likelihood that the auditor will understand its
relationship as being larger than the audit client's management is en-
hanced by how well the audit committee interfaces with the auditor. A
strong relationship between the auditor and the audit committee will
overcome the natural deference built into auditing standards. That
deference arises from the auditor's perspective that the financial state-
ments are the responsibility of the management so that management's
choices, estimates, and other accounting decisions are reversed only
when outside the applicable principles' based standard. Obviously the
auditor's ability to clearly define the parameters of permissible acts
depends not only on her own perception of her independence, but
also on a healthy understanding of the need to explain her position to
an inquiring audit committee. On this point, it is significant that SOX
carries forward requirements earlier contained in the NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ listing requirements for a dialogue regularly to occur
between the auditor and the audit committee. Moreover, now the au-
dit committee must disclose in filed SEC reports whether it has recom-
mended to the board of directors that the audited financial
statements should be included in filings with the SEC.29 The overall
impact of this requirement is to draw the audit committee members
closer to the publication of the financial statements so that they have a
greater sense of responsibility for the reports.30
Several points flow from the above. First, the audit committee did
not arrive with SOX, and certainly the requirement of an indepen-
dent audit committee staffed by financially literate members did not
emerge explicitly from SOX's mandates. Instead, SOX makes total in-
dependence mandatory for all reporting companies and extends the
audit committee requirement to regulated foreign issuers. Second,
SOX changes the auditor's relationship with the firm from being de-
pendent on management to being dependent on an audit committee.
This is truly an important step toward strengthening financial report-
ing. Third, SOX codifies various requirements previously set forth in
29. Item 3 04(a) (4) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 228.306(a) (4) (2004).
30. Regarding their legal exposure, consider Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d
1057 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding directors who sign Form 10-K as primary participants for
misrepresentations made in that document, subject, of course, to the requirement they did
so with scienter).
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listing standards regarding what the audit committee members and
the auditor must regularly discuss and review among themselves. 3 1
This is significant because it asks the audit committee to view its re-
sponsibilities beyond simply hiring the auditor and periodically in-
quiring into the auditor's performance. The audit committee is now
required to review with the auditor the critical accounting judgments,
estimates, and choices made by management.
Thus, the steps taken in Chapters One and Two of SOX should
be seen as steps calculated to improve financial reporting by public
companies. Minimally, the corporate governance environment post-
SOX is more hospitable for principles-based accounting metrics to
function in the best interests of investors and not be manipulated by
managers to serve their interests. More generally, reinvigorating inde-
pendence for auditors and providing the auditor with a less conflicted
"client" than the managers, in combination, redound to the benefit of
more reliable financial reporting.
II. It is an Empirical Question
Those who prefer that economic activity be guided solely by the
invisible hand of market forces and not by the tightened fist of the
government regulator assert, with some predictability, that whether a
particular matter should be regulated, as well as the optimal regula-
tory approach, is an empirical question. This is the thesis taken by
Professor Roberta Romano in the most pointed attack on SOX to
date. 32 Professor Romano engages in an extensive review of the hear-
ings leading up to the enactment of SOX as well as cataloging the
abundant empirical work on such issues as audit committee indepen-
dence, the impact of non-audit services on financial reporting, and
the role of loans to executives. In her review she collects an extensive
amount of empirical studies that investigated whether links existed be-
tween various financial reporting abuses, audit committee indepen-
dence, and the relative amount of non-audit fees auditors receive
from their audit clients. The various studies she reviews provide a use-
ful backdrop for considering just how we can better employ empiri-
cism in the formulation of regulations.
The issue of the role of empirical support for regulatory initia-
tives was at the core of Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange
31. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 204, 116 Stat. 745, 773
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000)).
32. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1521-29 (2005).
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Commission.33 Following a number of widely-publicized abuses by high
ranking employees of mutual funds, the SEC strengthened the gov-
ernance requirements that a mutual fund must meet if the fund
wishes to avail itself of certain safe harbors for transactions between
the fund and its advisor or a person affiliated with its advisor.34 Due to
the inherently incestuous nature of mutual funds, invoking the safe
harbors is so routine that the heightened governance requirements
become the norm for most funds. The cornerstone for the new safe
harbors is that seventy-five percent of the fund's directors must be in-
dependent, and the chairman of the fund's board of directors must
also be independent. 35 Among the Chamber's many complaints is that
the SEC, before adopting its new governance rules, should have gath-
ered empirical data bearing upon the effect of an independent chair-
man on fund performance. 3 6 The Chamber's argument on this point
had support within the rule-making proceeding. A study conducted by
Fidelity Management ("Fidelity Study") was submitted to the SEC dur-
ing the rule-making process. The Fidelity Study showed that funds
with independent chairs did not perform better than those whose
chairs were linked to the funds' advisors. In adopting the indepen-
dent chair requirement, the SEC concluded that the Fidelity Study
was limited in significance by reasoning that important benefits ex-
isted other than fund performance that an independent chair could
assist a fund in achieving.3 7 Chairman Donaldson was less delicate,
observing "there are no empirical studies that are worth much." 38 The
Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the SEC to consider the
costs mutual funds would incur in order to comply with the two new
conditions for the safe harbor, as well as to give adequate considera-
tion to the alternative approach. 39 Under the alternative approach,
each mutual fund would be required prominently to disclose whether
33. 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Subsequently, the SEC relied on cost data to sup-
port its change in which data was not in the rulemaking record. This action was held im-
proper so that the SEC's adoption of the rule was vacated; however, the court delayed
issuing its mandate so as to permit the SEC a chance to reopen the record. See Chamber of
Commerce v. S.E.C., 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
34. Chamber, 412 F.3d at 133.
35. See Final Rule: Investment Company Governance, Inv. Co. Rel. No. 26520 (Sept. 7,
2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-26520.
htm (last viewed June 10, 2006).
36. Chamber, 412 F.3d at 142.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 136.
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the fund has an independent or an inside chairman. 40 While not a
victory for the SEC, the court was "acutely aware that an agency need
not-indeed cannot-base its every action upon empirical data; de-
pending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be 'entitled
to conduct ... a general analysis based on informed conjecture.'"41
This does not, however, resolve the question of what the SEC should
do when confronted with studies, such as those relied upon by Profes-
sor Romano or the Chamber, that conflict with its proposed regula-
tory initiatives.
At the risk of being placed in a category that includes skinheads
who burn books, the author finds the call for empiricism a bit empty.
Certainly good empirical studies provide rich insights to both the ne-
cessity for regulation as well as the likely impact of a certain regula-
tion. Nevertheless, several reasons come to mind as to why the
thoughtful and forceful calls for empirical support for SOX, such as
those made by Professor Romano, should only be used to counsel that
the empirical tools employed to examine data are peculiarly sensitive
to the particular regulatory issue. Moreover, several areas exist where
empiricism is not useful in assessing the social welfare associated with
a regulatory choice.
A. False Hopes of Event Studies
First is the popular view that the social desirability of a rule can be
decided by observed changes in the value (return) of a firm imple-
menting the new rule. On this point, consider earlier studies that con-
clude derivative suits are not socially worthwhile because their
initiative, prosecution, and settlement do not produce a detectable
change in the market-price of the corporation on whose behalf the
suit is brought.42 Similarly, some have argued that shareholder rights
vis-a-vis the board of directors, or managers on various governance
matters, can never get too far out of the optimal range because of the
disciplining effects of the market for control on a company whose pro-
40. Id. at 144.
41. Id. at 142.
42. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261,
280 (1986) (finding that successful derivative suits yield no statistically significant abnormal
returns in stockholder returns when court denies defendants' pretrial motions); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61
(1991) ("To the extent that derivative suits consistently return less to shareholders than
class actions, there is a greater likelihood that more of these suits are frivolous.").
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tection for its owners is too lax.4 3 To this end, studies of how stock
prices respond positively to announcements of companies reincorpo-
rating in Delaware have been invoked as evidence that Delaware's
well-recognized management friendly laws are optimal. 44
In most instances involving public companies, however, the prob-
lem with this approach is that the recovery in a derivative suit or the
negative value associated with poor governance is neither material vis-
d-vis the firm's overall market value nor is it sufficiently material to
attract a suitor who would challenge the governance mechanism. 45 In
the case of the derivative suit, this is because most derivative suits are
not for on-going mismanagement that produces a large loss to the
firm. The grist for derivative suits are single-shot transactions, invaria-
bly involving a conflict of interest, where the amount is significant to
the defendant in the action, and is significant enough to attract an
attorney to prosecute the suit on a contingency basis4 6 but is not sig-
nificant to the firm relative to its revenues or market capitalization.
These suits are "compensatory" only if compensatory means that the
costs of prosecution do not exceed the suits' expected benefits. In
sum, the view that the market is the measure of all the benefits and
costs of alternative regimes is substantially qualified.
In the governance arena the calculus becomes even more
opaque. Good governance, whatever the particular proposal, rarely
can be expected to yield quantifiable benefits. Certainly this is the
43. See Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
44. A useful review of the studies appears in ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF
COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 72-73 (2002). On this point, con-
sider the difficulty of isolating variables that can tilt the studies' findings because of biases
within the data set itself. Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62J.
FIN. ECON. 525, 533 (2001) (finding Delaware incorporated firms enjoy a five percent
higher value than non-Delaware firms) with Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware
Effect, 20J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004) (finding that Daimes' study reflects a "small firm
effect" and also that the observed greater values disappear in larger firms when examined
over time, specifically during 1991-2002).
45. Similar reasoning has been invoked in gauging whether state corporation laws are
optimal or suboptimal. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 204-206 (9th ed. Unabr. 2005) (stating cost of suboptimal governance
rules are likely to be small and not sufficient to attract a bidder).
46. See generally James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for
Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745 (1984). Because suits are so focused, as
a practical matter, their prosecution depends not on the tangible benefits conferred on
their plaintiff but also those benefits conferred to the plaintiff's attorney. As a result, such
suits are hardly compensatory and, if that is the metric of their social value, they inevitably
fail to meet that standard. See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65
BROOK. L. REV. 3, 13-19 (1999).
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case in the relatively short term. Corporate governance proposals op-
erate to protect the interest of stockholders and the firm generally as
compared with what might happen in their absence. Thus, any ex-
pected benefits attributable to corporate governance lay in the uncer-
tain future where there is uncertainty both as to their occurrence and
the magnitude of any resulting harm that better governance will
avoid. Any quantification of these benefits are not likely to be im-
pounded in the firm's stock price after discounting the uncertainty of
their benefit. To be sure, we would expect that internal procedures
that make it more difficult for the firm's managers to reward them-
selves at the company's expense would be taken into consideration by
efficient capital markets in pricing the firm's shares. But the weight
given to this factor will pale when contrasted with a wider range of
factors such as the state of the national and regional economy, the
firm's technological edge vis-t-vis competitors, and management's
track record for maximizing shareholder value.
This does not mean governance is not relevant; it merely means it
will be hard to observe empirical evidence in a security's price variable
because it is most likely at the margins of a wide range of inputs in
valuing the firm. Conversely, the costs of corporate governance are
easily quantified, 47 so that critics of regulation in this area focus their
attention on that which is most easily quantified: the cost of
regulation. 48
47. SeeJames S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter & Tina Yang, Effects and Unintended Consequences
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Boards (CAFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, Working
Paper, August 31, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=687496 (study of
nearly 7000 public companies finding that post-SOX expenses related to boards rose dra-
matically and percentage-wise higher for smaller companies whose director fees (as a rela-
tion to $1000 of net sales) rose $0.84 from 2001 to 2004, whereas larger firms fees rose
$0.32 during this same time period).
48. An even more fundamental question is the appropriateness of the assumption
implicit in event studies that the market measures, fairly accurately and rapidly, all vari-
ables that affect shareholder wealth. This, of course, implicates the hypothesis that securi-
ties markets are efficient, at least for the universe of companies within the investigators'
samples. Quite separate from doubts regarding the efficiency of capital markets in pricing
corporate norms is the issue of whether such a focus is too narrow. For the view that empir-
icists should, at least, explain why their preoccupation with shareholder wealth effects
should dominate corporate policymaking in light that many constituencies other than
shareholders are affected by the results of such policymaking. SeeJill E. Fisch, Measuring
Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, (Fordham Law Legal Studies Re-
search Paper No. 105, Dec., 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=878391.
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B. The Lack of Definitive Inputs Frustrates the Realization of
Empirical Evidence
A second concern is the indefiniteness of the inputs that are in-
herent in an empirical evaluation of the benefits of governance. On
this point, consider the contrasting results of studies that have ex-
amined whether independent directors increase the returns of the
companies on which they serve. In a much celebrated study of board
size and board composition with firm performance, Professors Sanjai
Bhagat and Bernard Black classified the directors serving on the
boards of 957 corporations as
inside directors (persons who are currently officers of the com-
pany), affiliated directors (relatives of officers; persons who are
likely to have business relationships with the company, such as in-
vestment bankers and lawyers; and persons who were officers in the
recent past) ... and independent directors (outside directors with-
out such affiliations). 49
A particular board's relative independence is then determined by sub-
tracting the proportion of inside directors from the proportion of in-
dependent directors. 50 They then measured corporate performance
by four metrics: Tobin's q,5' return on assets (ratio of operating in-
come to assets), ratio of sales to assets, and market-adjusted stock
price returns.52 Further, Bhagat and Black used control variables such
as: board size, percent of stock owned by CEOs or outside directors,
firm size (proxied by sales), number of outside five percent
blockholders, and industry control through classification into industry
groups.53
They found an inverse correlation between firm performance
and board independence. 5 4 However, this finding is not evidence that
a greater number of non-affiliated and independent directors leads to
49. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 239 (2002) (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 239-40 ("This effectively treats independent, affiliated, and inside directors
as having weights of +1, 0, and -1, respectively.").
51. Tobin's q is the ratio of the market value of a firm's assets to the book value
of its assets. It is often approximated by the ratio of the market value of a firm's
long-term debt and equity to the book value of its long term debt and equity.
Tobin's q is used as a measure of good management because high Tobin's q
suggests that a firm's managers have produced greater market value from the
same assets.
Id. at 236 n.20.
52. Id. at 242.
53. Id. at 243.
54. Id. at 263.
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improved firm performance. 55 To the contrary, Bhagat and Black re-
port that "[i]f anything, there are hints that greater board indepen-
dence may impair firm performance." 56
It is important to qualify the study by Bhagat and Black. They did
not seek more qualitative inputs to assess the relative independence of
their "independent" directors. Had they done this, they would have
questioned whether more than merely the absence of financial or fa-
milial dependence from the firm or the firms' officers should be re-
quired for true "independence." What the firm should seek is true
independence, and, more importantly, independence should be
equated to a commitment to act independently.
Consider the approach taken by Ira M. Millstein and Paul W.
MacAvoy, who, in addition to using the independence "grade" as-
signed to the board by California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem ("CalPERS"), also determined relative board independence from
survey data for the 154 observed companies so that a board was deter-
mined to be independent if one of the following was present: (1) it
had a non-executive chairman or lead director, (2) outside directors
held meetings without management present, or (3) there was substan-
tial adherence to the corporate governance principles established at
General Motors.57 They next measured corporate performance by us-
ing an excess return metric while controlling for industry classifica-
tion and the relative life cycle of the firm. 58 They found that only
companies that received the highest grade from CalPERS enjoyed an
above average excess return,59 and that companies who satisfied the
second metric for board independence did better during the five-year
observation period than boards that did not follow one of the three
procedures. 60 In contrast to Bhagat and Black, Millstein and MacAvoy
conclude that independent boards have a statistically significant posi-
tive impact on corporate performance. 61
The difference between the findings of Bhagat and Black versus
Millstein and MacAvoy is their dissimilar inputs. As Millstein and Mac-
55. Id. at 233.
56. Id.
57. Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of
the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1283, 1302 (1998).
58. Id. at 1302-03, 1310.
59. Id. at 1312.
60. Id. at 1313 (noting that on average over the five-year period the companies incor-
porating these procedures into their operation had an excess percentage annual rate of
return that was 4.94% higher than companies that did not).
61. Id. at 1318.
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Avoy make clear, a threshold consideration of any empirical study of
the value of a governance change is whether a change in fact has oc-
curred, i.e., the empiricist captured the impact of a change in compo-
sition of the board of directors or a change in the level of engagement
by the board due to a true change in the board's independence. 62
This concern is equally true for studies of changes in the role and
composition of audit committees of the relative amount of non-audit
revenues to the outside auditors on accruals and other management-
instigated manipulations of financial reporting. Unless one is assured
that the audit committees are truly independent, as established by the
standards used by Millstein and MacAvoy in their study, there is no
reason to believe it was a meaningful examination of the correlation
between reporting abuses and the amount of non-audit revenues re-
ceived by the accountant. It may well be that more non-audit revenues
must be directed to the auditor who operates under the watchful eye
of a diligent, independent committee. A less diligent audit committee
may encourage equally slumbering behavior on the part of the audi-
tor so that less is needed in the way of non-audit revenues to assure
the auditor's complicity. To the extent the studies of earnings manip-
ulations have failed also to investigate whether audit committees pro-
vide meaningful oversight of the outside auditor, the findings of
studies between non-audit revenues and earnings manipulations are
seriously weakened.
C. Correlation Versus Causation
Third, there is always the question of just how to interpret the
results of empiricism. More particularly, there is a question of to what
degree a causal relation between X and Y, the observed misconduct, is
necessary to show that X needs to be regulated to prevent Y. We all
know that even though a majority of the nation's hurricane insurance
is purchased by Florida residents, 63 and Florida has the highest inci-
dences of hurricanes, it does not mean that hurricane insurance
causes hurricanes. Or, as my statistics professor, who obviously came
from another era, observed, "burlesque does not cause baldness" (a
62. Id. at 1299.
63. While there is no data collected for "hurricane" insurance since such a policy does
not exist, there is data on "flood" insurance reflecting that in 2004 Florida households
consumed 23.1 percent of the United States Flood coverage. National Flood Insurance
Program, Total Number of Policies in Force as of September 30, 2004, available at http://
www.fema.gov/graphics/nfip/totpif2004.gif.
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reference to the prevalence of aged but eager gentlemen populating
the first row seats of most burlesque shows).
The problem of correlation and causation is reflected in Profes-
sor Romano's review of twenty-four empirical studies inquiring into
whether the provision of non-audit services by a firm's auditors made
it more likely that the firm would engage in a reporting abuse. A
handful of the summarized studies found such a connection. 64 To il-
lustrate the challenges faced by the regulators and Congress when
confronted with dissimilar study methodologies and conflicting re-
sults, consider the following two published studies that were among
the more recent studies considered by Professor Romano. In one
study, Professors Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson find that the frequen-
cies of abnormal accruals increases as more non-audit services are pro-
vided by a firm's outside auditor.65 In the second study, Professors
Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew make the same findings as the Fran-
kel study,66 although this result is not reported by Professor Romano.
However, when Ashbaugh et al. separated accruals between those that
increased income and those that decreased, they found a connection
between non-audit fees only with respect to accruals that decrease in-
come-not for accruals that increase income. 67
Consider the puzzlement of the regulator or even Congress when
faced with such conflicting reports. Each study examined financial re-
ports of over 3000 public companies and regressed a variety of vari-
ables, such as the ratio of non-audit services against observed
discretionary accruals. From this, the statistical significance of vari-
ables on the observed accruals were measured and ultimately reported
as findings.
The methods used in each of the studies are known to be reliable
and commonly used in such empiricism. However, what is not cap-
tured is the percentage of the 3000 observed discretionary accruals
accompanied by non-audit services by the auditor. That is, the studies
did not reveal whether suspect reporting practices occurred in five,
ten, or fifteen percent of the observed firms. Knowing these amounts
would thereby frame an important policy-making question: how preva-
lent suspect reporting practices should be to justify regulatory action.
64. See Romano, supra note 32, at 1604 n.230.
65. Richard M. Frankel, Marilyn F. Johnson & Karen K. Nelson, The Relation Between
Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Management, 77 THE Acer. REv. 71, 73
(Supp. 2002).
66. Hollis Asbaugh, Ryan LaFond & Brian W. Mayhew, Do Nonaudit Services Compromise
Auditor Independence? Further Evidence, 78 THE Accr. REv. 611, 625 (2003).
67. Id. at 625-626.
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Certainly, policy making, and more precisely discrete cost-benefit
analysis of regulation, is not dependent upon the abuse happening in
a majority of the cases or even when the variable is statistically signifi-
cant in explaining among other observed forces a cause for the abuse.
The above illustrative studies raise several questions. First, why
have so many talented researchers examined whether non-audit ser-
vices impact the auditor's independence? There are multiple answers
to this question. In the 1980s, the Big Five accounting firms trans-
formed themselves from audit firms that provided a variety of consult-
ing services, to multi-disciplined business advisement firms that also
provided auditing services. To this end, cross selling of non-audit ser-
vices became an important component in each audit engagement
partner's total compensation package. This strategy reflected that
non-audit services had the potential for considerably more revenue
growth than only audit services. In 1970, income from audits repre-
sented seventy percent of the Big Eight accounting firms' total reve-
nues; twenty-eight years later just the opposite was the case. Audit
revenues did not keep pace with consulting revenues, and in 1998,
audit revenues represented only thirty percent of the Big Five's total
revenues. 68 It also is worth considering how the provision of non-audit
services places a potential carrot-stick in the hands of managers when
dealing with an accountant who questions management's reporting of
a transaction. Prior to SOX, absent a non-audit relationship, the man-
agement could-when pushed by the inquisitive auditor-fire the au-
ditor. However, auditing rules require that the firing of an auditor
must be quickly reported on Form 8-K.69 This admission would surely
pique the interests of the investment community and most likely the
SEC.
On the other hand, threatening to shift the auditor's lucrative
consulting contract to another vendor is not a required reportable
event on Form 8-K. Hence, the provision of significant (to the audit
engagement partner) non-audit services provides management with
greater leverage over the outside auditor than if the auditor provided
only audit services. This reality provides ample reason to skeptically
68. See The SEC's Proposed Auditor Independence Rules: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statements of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission); M. McNamee et al., Accounting Wars, Bus. Wv., at 157, Sept. 25, 2000.
69. SEC Form 8-K, Item 4.01, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.
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view the uncontrolled mix of non-audit and audit services by an
outside accountant.
It is notable that most of these studies have not found a statisti-
cally significant relationship between the amount of non-audit reve-
nues and questionable reporting practices by the auditor's client. This
invites the question of what level of significance in practice justifies
regulation of the provision of non-audit services? The regressions of
data in the studies reviewed by Professor Romano provide broad in-
sights into variables that are statistically significant and insignificant in
examining causes for various forms of reporting abuses. Left unan-
swered in the portfolio of studied firms in each study is the number of
instances in each studied universe where the provision of non-audit
services compromised the audit. That is, finding a lack of significance
in a regression of a set of variables does not answer the question of
whether abuses nonetheless are occurring, albeit below the level of
statistical significance or significance as against other variables.
The intuition that non-audit services compromise the indepen-
dence of the auditor is not set to rest by saying that this occurs only in
a minority, or even a distinct minority, of the observed firms. Simi-
larly, if the studies resoundingly show-what, in fact, they do not
show-that the provision of non-audit services are statistically signifi-
cant variables explaining a host of reporting abuses by public compa-
nies, would this justify a blanket prohibition? In the face of such a
showing, we would expect regulation to be tighter than it is under the
present data set.
What this hypothesis reflects is that the treatment, in terms of
frequency and magnitude, of misconduct should guide the regulatory
course taken. For example, unless there is demonstrative empirical
evidence that non-audit services never compromises auditor indepen-
dence, the intuition would appear to wisely inform regulation.
SOX takes just such a measured course. It absolutely prohibits
seven relatively narrow categories of non-audit services 70 and condi-
70. The excluded areas had largely been deserted when SOX was enacted, as by that
time three of the Big Four accounting firms had disposed of consulting operations
through which most of the prohibited services occurred. Some of the prohibited items can
be seen as necessary to prevent the auditor from necessarily auditing its own work. This
would be true for bookkeeping, systems design, appraisals, and actuarial services. Other
prohibited services compromise its independence because they are essentially staffing or
advisory functions in the client's operations, such as running the human resources depart-
ment, conducting brokerage services, and engaging in internal auditing. Indeed, the latter
service is so far afield of the independence we expect of accountants it is no small wonder
that these activities were ever tolerated.
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tions the provision of any other type of non-audit services on pre-ap-
proval by the board of directors. 71 Contrary to the claims of Professor
Romano, this reflects the uncertain nature of the empirical data (all
of which is too lumpy to identify just when and what type of service is
likely to compromise the auditor's independence). Thus, resorting to
the well-received monitoring role of independent directors to regu-
late the company's auditor's provision of non-audit services is a per-
fectly sensible solution to an otherwise indeterminant empirical base
but a soundly based intuitive fear.
Indeed, we mightjust reverse the question for Professor Romano:
what steps would the empirical data she marshals support? How do we
resolve which direction to take? Since eighteen out of twenty-four
studies upon which she reports find no relationship between non-au-
dit services and financial reporting abuses, does this mean auditors
should have no restraints on providing non-audit services to their au-
dit clients? Further, many of the studies relied upon by Professor Ro-
mano dealt with corporations whose audit committees did not reflect
the strengthening of audit committees in 1999 through the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ listing requirements. As discussed earlier, the
frequency of manipulative accounting accruals and other harmful re-
porting practices are independently linked to the degree of audit
committee oversight. Thus, finding no greater accounting accruals
when the auditor engages in significant consulting that when there is
no consulting may as easily document that consulting is not necessary
to corrupt the auditor when there is a weak audit committee. To be
sure, empiricism certainly sharpens the focus. Although the studies
relied upon by Professor Romano were not considered by Congress, if
these studies had been considered Congress most assuredly would
have done what it did with SOX-ban some practices outright and
condition others on pre-screening.
D. Database Limitations
A final concern for empiricism is the inherent limit of available
databases. As examined earlier, investigators depend on how informa-
tion is collected. Thus, researchers focus on management's classifica-
tion of directors as being independent rather than the more
meaningful standard of the director's attentiveness and active engage-
ment in monitoring management's stewardship of the firm. Similarly,
71. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 117 Stat. No. 745,
771-72 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 2006)) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
l(g) (i) (2000)).
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investigators review the amount of non-audit fees relative to the audit
fees. A more meaningful inquiry would look at the engagement part-
ner's opinion of the relative importance of audit fees and cross-selling
non-audit services. Databases do not reveal this highly personal equa-
tion but few would deny that we might better understand the lack of
independence demonstrated by Mr. David Duncan, the engagement
audit partner at Enron, by the fact that seventy-six percent of his in-
come depended on selling non-audit services to Enron. Studies of the
role of non-audit services that fail to capture this variable do not cap-
ture the impact of non-audit services on the individual accountant's
independence.
Moreover, event studies that measure the abnormal returns of
studied companies in relation to a regulated event commonly exclude
companies that have become bankrupt or have been acquired. The
frequently used Computstat database automatically removes firms
when either of these events occur. As a result, studies generally do not
include marginal, failing, or failed firms, even though there is good
reason to suspect that those firms pose the greatest incentives for in-
siders to engage in reporting abuses. 72 Empiricism is skewed as related
to market regulation issues in terms of shifting the focus more heavily
toward healthy, large public companies which leaves the regulatory
agencies to rely only on intuition for the smaller, less studied, compa-
nies. Empirical insights gleaned from studies of larger companies do
not overcome that intuition and, as seen above, the empiricist is nec-
essarily confined by a data-set that does not even reveal whether direc-
tors are engaged independent directors.
III. Conclusion
SOX is a major piece of legislation and, as typically happens in
the final hours before certain enactment, the bill is open to amend-
ments that are less thoughtful than others. There most assuredly were
such provisions tacked onto SOX as it rushed to enactment. But as
Professor Romano's study indicates, there were extensive hearings
72. An important study of the profile of companies that engage in reporting viola-
tions such that they become the subject of SEC enforcement actions found that most are
companies with a market capitalization of less than $200 million. Professors Arlen and
Carney also report that most of the instances they studied of companies whose executives
knowingly engaged in financial reporting violations were companies experiencing finan-
cial distress or companies whose executives believed that if they could survive the current
fiscal period, they would be able to remedy the financial defalcation they were committing.
SeeJennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on the Market, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REv. 691 (1992).
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predating the July 2002 enactment of SOX. And, as outlined above,
there is a coherent core of concepts designed to strengthen the finan-
cial reporting process. SOX's major contributions, as reviewed in Part
I, are both the thoughtful and integrated responses to the many ills
that plagued financial reporting. Central to this mission was assuring
the independence of standard setters for both accounting metrics and
auditing procedures. Also central was assuring the independence of
the outside auditor, by anchoring its relationship with the audit com-
mittee and prescribing a framework for an activist audit committee.
It's a different world than existed prior to SOX because there is more
reason to have faith in the financial reporting of public companies.
